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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
FRED SULLIVAN,

Cross-Complainant and Respondent

vs
HARVEY STONE, S & I TRUCKING CO.,
Defendants and Appellants.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
NATURE OF THE! APPEAL
On April 20, 1957, at about 10 :30 P.M. on Highway
30 \vest of Castle Rock, Utah, a truck driven by Lloyd
V. Higginbotham crashed into the rear of a parked
truck owned by S & I Trucking Company and driven by
Harvey Stone. A few moments later, a car driven by
John Schweitzer coining the other direction crashed
into both trucks.
Florence Schweitzer, passenger in the automobile,
filed suit for injuries received against Harvey Stone,
S & I Trucking Company, Lloyd V. Higginbotham, WestSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ern Auto Transport Company (employer -of Lloyd V.
Higginbotham) and Fred Sullivan (owner of the second
truck). Ivan Sheffy, a Hecond employee of S & I Trucking Company, intervened in the suit seeking damages
against Lloyd V. Higginbotham, Western Auto Transport Company and Fred Sullivan. Harve)'·Stone and S &
I Trucking Con1pany cross claimed against Lloyd V.
Higginbotham, Fred Sullivan and Western Auto Transport Company and Lloyd V. Higginbotha1n, Fred Sullivan and W·estern Auto Transport Company cross
claimed against Harvey Stone and S & I Trucking Company.
On the trial of the case, Western Auto Transport
Company, Fred Sullivan and Lloyd V. Higginbotham
settled with Florence Schweitzer for $10,000.00. The
jury returned a verdict in favor of Florence Schweitzer
and against all defendants except Fred Sullivan in the
amount of $23,000.00. A judgment of $13,000.00 was
entered against Harvey Stone and S & l Trucking Company, who appealed to this Court from the judgment.
This appeal was dis1nisS'ed prior to argument by stipulation. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Ivan
Sheffy and against Lloyd V. Higginbotham and Western
Auto Transport Company in the sum of $4,500.00, an
appeal from which judgment is now pending decision·
in this court. A further verdict of the jury was a judg~
1nent of $8,000.00 in favor of Fred Sullivan and· againstHarvey Stone and S & I Trucking Company. This app!eal is fron1 that judgn1ent.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On April 20, 1957, Harvey Stone, an employee of
2
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the S & I 1_1 rucking Co1npany, was driving a truck and
trailer of that co1npany loaded with drilling mud. He
and t\\·o other S & I drivers had loaded their trucks in
Salt Lake City earlier that day, and were driving eastward on U. S. 30s toward Evanston, Wyoming. Late
that evening, the three S & I Trucks were approaching
a hill, or incline, about 16.7 miles east of Echo J unction. At this point the road becomes three-lane with
t\VO lanes going uphill, or eastward, and one lane downhill or \vestward (Ex. H-20 and H-13).
Approaching this hill Stone attempted to pass the
lead truck, and while passing in the center lane his
engine stalled. ( Tr. 75). Stone coasted uphill and as
far as possible to the right until his truck stopped.
(Tr. 78).
The last S & I Truck, driven by Ivan Sheffy, passed
Stone's truck on the left without crossing the center
lane and parked 400 or 500 feet farther up the highway
(Tr. 259, 260). Sheffy parked his truck as far to the
right as he could, set the brakes, left the headlights on
lo\v bean1 and the clearance lights on, the turn indicator
blinking, and proceeded back to Stone's truck to see if
he could be of help (Tr. 261).
In the Ineantime, Stone turned off his headlights,
leaving his clearance lights, taillights and brake lights
on (Tr. 263, 353). He believed he had run out of gas,
had S\vitched to the auxiliary tank and was trying to
start the engine. ( Tr. 76, 265). Immediately thereafter a truck loaded 'vith new pickups and driven by
Lloyd V. Higginbotha1n, smashed into the rear of the
S & I Truck. Neither Stone nor Sheffy saw or heard
3
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the approach of the Higginbothan1 Truck.
The truck that ran into the S & I vehicle was owned
by Fred Sullivan, leased to Western Auto Transport
Company, and driven by Lloyd V. Higginbotham. At
the time of the collision, Sullivan was in the sleeper
compartment of the cab of the tractor. (Tr. 198).
Both Stone_ and Sheffy
testified that the S & I Truck
. ·was entirely :, -1 the outer lane, leaving the center (east
bound) lane free for vehicles. (Tr. 78, 259, 260). The
paved roadway at the point of collision is 46 feet in
width, divided into two eastbound lanes and one westboun<i lane. (Ex. H-13). Higginbotham testified that
he saw nothing until he was 70 feet a"\vay from the
stalled truck, and further testified that from the appearanc;e of the truck at 70 feet he could not tell whether
the clearance lights were burning or not. (Tr. 93, 100).
The investigating officer placed the left rear of the
truck approximately 3 feet over into the center lane
of traffic. (Tr. 139, Ex. 13).
-'-

This was a dark, clear night, with no precipitation
at the time of the accident. (Tr. 110). From the west,
approaching the scene of the accident as Higginbotham
did, there is 8/10 of a mile unobstructed visibility. (PreTrial Order R-25). There 'vere no oncoming cars or
obstructions of any kind. (Tr. 92). Higginbotham's
headlights were burning (Tr. 91). The S & I truck
weighed about 25 tons loaded 'vith the sacked drilling
mud (Tr. 303). The rear of the truck was painted
white, had 5 clearance lights, t\vo large reflectors, and
a taillight. (Tr. 255, 256).
Prior to subn1ission of the case to the jury, the
4
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

trial court ruled as a Inatter of law Higginbotham's
actions 'vere not ehargeable to Sullivan, the o'vner of
truek. lT pon the jury's finding that Stone was negli~
gent und that such negligence was a proximate cause
of the collision, the court directed the jury to assess
da1nage sustained by Sullivan. Upon such assessment,
the court entered judgment in favor of Sullivan in the
autount of $8,000.00. This :11dgment i" the one now
appealed from.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. The Court erred in refusing to instruct the
jur~? in accordance with Appellants requested instruction nu1nber t\vo.
II. The Court erred in ruling as a Inatter of law
that Higginbotham's negligence 'vas not chargeable
to Respondent Fred Sullivan.
III. The Court erred in the for1n of the questions
in the special verdict submitted to the jury.
ARGUMENT

I.
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO IN~
STRUCT THE JURY IN ACCORDANCE WIT:g APPELLAKTS REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NUMBER TWO.
Appellants requested instruction number· two is
as follows : ( R-65)
"You are instructed that the driver of the
Western Auto Transport Truck was negligent as
5
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a matter of law, and if you find that he observed
the stopped S & I Truck upon the highvvay or
under the circumstances should have observed
said S & I Truck, but because of his negligence
failed to do so in time to avoid the accident, then
you are instructed that the negligence on his
part was the sole proximate cause of the collision between the Western Auto Truck and the
S & I Truck, and your verdict lllust be in favor
defendants Harvey Stone and S & I Trucking
Company, and against Florence Schweitzer, Fred
Sullivan, Lloyd V. Higgenbotham and Western
Auto Transport Company in their clailns against
Harvey Stone and S &I Trucking Con1pany, and
you will further find in favor of Harvey Stone,
Ivan Sheffy and S & I Trucking Company, and
against Llloyd V. Higginbotham and Western
Auto Transport Company, and return verdicts
therefore in accordance with the instruction on
damages hereinafter given you."
Higginbotham testified that he was awake, and
despite the fact that there were no distractions or oncoming cars, did not see the parked truck until he was
·10 fHet away. In this connection, it should be noted
the physical evidence gave no corroboration to Higginbotham's testimony that he saw the truck at 70 feet
and tried to avoid it. (Tr. 152, 156).
Under Utah cases, Higginbotham was negligent as
a Inatter of lavv whether the S & I Truck was unlighted
(Dalley v. Mid Western Dairy Products Co., 80 Ut.
331, 15 Pac. 2nd 309) or lighted (Hirshback v. Dubuque
Packing Co., 7 Ut. 27, 316 Pac. 2nd 319).
With Higginbotha1n negligence as a Inatter of law,
the question that n1ust be resolved is whether such
6
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neg-I igt\n<'P ,,·a~ the sole proxiinate cause of the accident.
This ( \> u rt has <~onsidered the saine question under
si1nilnr fa<'ts in several cases. The two most recent
<~a~es are Hillyard v. Utah By-Products Co., 1 Ut. 2nd
14-:1, and ~Ic1Iurdie v. Underwood, 9 Ut. 2nd 400, 346
Pac. 2nd 711.

These cases, and the ones before them, draw "a
clear-cut distinction between two classes of cases." As
we understand it, the first situation is when one negligent!)' creates a dangerous condition (parking a truck)
and the later actor observed, or circumstances are such
that he could not fail to observe, but negligently fails
to avoid it.
The second situation is where the later actor negligently becon1es confronted with an emergency situation.
Under the first situation, as a matter of law, the negligence of the later actor interrupts the sequence of·
events and cuts off the effect of the negligence of the
first actor, while in the second situation it is a jury
question as to "\Vhether the first actors negligence was
a proximate cause.
One of the first cases to set out this principle was
Haarstrich v. Oregon Short Line Company, 70 Ut. 552,
262, P. 100. In this case the driver of the oncoming
car had 900 feet unobstructed view of the train on the
road,vay, and failed to avoid it. This Court held that
as a Inatter of law the negligence of the oncoming
driver was the sole proximate cause of the collision.
Under facts quite similar to the instant case, this
court upheld a finding that the oncoming driver was
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the sole proximate cause of the collision in Lewis v.
Savage, 7 U t. 2nd 220, 322 P. 2nd 152. In that case,
this court said :
"Where, as in this case, the parking of the truck
created no danger or hazard to others using the
highway who use any ordinary caution to
see and avoid collisions with substantial ob-iects
plainly visible on the highvvay in front of thern,
the court's finding that the negligence of such
other driver was the sole proxi1nate cause of
the accident was reasonable and amply supported by the evidence."
•J

In the Hillyard case this court upheld a finding
that the negligence of parking the truck was a contributing cause of the accident, since under the facts of the case
(the second driver's view was obstructd by other vehicles) the second driver was negligently confronted
with an emergency situation. In so holding it was said:
"It thus seen1s proper to conclude that if the
evidence was such as to 1nake mandatory a finding that the driver Aston must have seen the
truck as he approached, but nevertheless ran into
it, that would have been something so unusual
and extraordinary as not to be reasonably foreseeable. In such instance, his negligence would
have been an independent intervening cause, insulating defendant's negligence as a proximate
cause and plaintiff's judgment could not be allowed to stand. If, however, the evidence is
susceptible of any reasonable interpretation which
would permit a finding that as Aston approached
the scene, his view \vas so obstructed by the
cars he was following and passing that at the
tilne the third car turned to its left to 1niss the

8
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truck the latter loomed up before him as an
e1nergency situation, then, even though he was
negligent in getting into such a predicament, a
jury question would exist as to whether the prior
negligent parking of the truck was also a concurring cause."
rrhe instruction here refused was patterned directly
upon the instruction approved in the case of McMurdie
v. Underwood, Supra. In approving this instruction it
was held:
"It does not seem unreasonable to conclude that
one who approaches a dangerous condition, created by the negligence of another, and either
sees it, or circumstances are such that one must
see it in time to avoid that danger, and fails to
do so, becomes the sole proximate cause of any
da1nage or injury caused thereby."
"Appellants did not claim nor prove that the
driver of the pickup truck was confronted with
an emergency situation so therefore the issue
rightfully went to the jury whether or not she
observed the hazard. Absent an emergency situation, Nancy Dillingham's failure to observe and
negligently colliding with the appellant became
the sole proximate cause of the collision. We
are of the opinion that the complained of instruction was proper."
Higginbotha~n

had over 4000 feet of unobstructed
vision of the S & I Truck, yet did not S'ee the vehicle
until 70 feet avvay. No distractions of any kind interfered with his vision. There was ample room to pass
the S & I Truck without crossing into the oncoming
lane of traffic. There was evidence all the clearance
lights were on. Under these facts, we submit the pro9
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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posed instruction was proper. It was clearly the jury's
province to determine whether, under these facts and
Utah law, Higginbotham's negligence was the sole
proximate cause of the collision.
Appellant was entitled to argue the la'v as set out
in appellant's requested instruction nu1nber two.
II.
THE COURT ERRE~D IN RULING AS A MATTER
OF LAW THAT HIGGINBOTHA~1'S NEGLIGENCE
WAS NOT CHARGEABLE TO RESPONDENT
FRED SULLIVAN.
Fred Sullivan was the owner of the tractor driven
by Lloyd V. Higginbotham (Pretrial Order). At the
time of the collision, he was in the sleeper compartment of the cab of the tractor (Tr. 198). Sullivan was
a "broker" for the two trucks under his arrangement
with Western Auto. (Tr. 216). He, as owner, had
leased the truck to Western Auto under that leas~e
agreement introduced in evidence as Ex. H-25. Approximately $200.00 per month of the operating expenses
were paid by respondent, and later reilnbursed by
Western Auto. (Tr. 212) These expenses were never
paid by Lloyd V. Higginbotham. (Tr. 211) Although
respondent testified that Western Auto had the right
to replace him with another driver, he admitted that
had never happened during his en1ployment. (Tr. 217)
The lease provides, among other things, as follows:
Respondent Sullivan's revenue from the Company
WaS a percentage ( 65 ro) of the ne.t COlllpany revenues
fro1n operation of the truck. (R-1, Ex. H-25).

10
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All opPrating exp·enses were to be borne by Sullivan. ( R-2, Ex. H-25).
rrhe wages paid to the driver (Higginbotham), although borne by the Co1npany, were in reality paid by
the ovvner (Sullivan) and withheld from his 65% of
revenue~. (R-2, Ex. H-25, paragraph IV.)
.AJl liability for accident, theft, etc., while on com-

pany business, was upon the owner, Sullivan.
ElX. H-25).

(R-2,

With these facts in mind, let us review the law on
the question of the responsibility of an owner present
in the car being driven by another. For Higginbotham
to he Sullivan's agent, the facts must be such as would
sustain a jury's finding that Sullivan had the right of
control over Higginbotham.
"The ·test of whether one is the agent of the other
depends upon the right of control of one over
the other". Fox v. Lavender, 89U. 115, 56 P. 2nd
1049.
The fact that Higginbotham was the servant of
Western Auto does not prevent Sullivan being chargeable with his negligence as well. Blashfield Cyc. of
Atttomobile Law & Practice, Vol. 5, Sec. 2920. This
principle is affir1ned in the annotation at 17 A L R 2nd,
page 1408, and in the case of Franceschino v. Mack, 102
.A. 2nd 217. In this case the Pennsylvania Court held:
"It should pehaps be notedthat two masters
may have control over one servant so as to
render both liable . . . Both the lender and the
borro"\ver may have control over the servant so
as to render each of then1 liable for his conduct ... "
11
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Therefore, the fact that Higginbotham was paid by
Western Auto is only one factor to be considered in
determining \vhether Higginbotham's negligence was
chargeable to Sullivan, and is not of itself determinative.
The fact that the written lease provided Western
Auto should have exclusive control is likewise a factor
to be considered, but is not determinative. See Tyler
v. Jansen, (Wyo.), 295 P. 2nd 742, where the court
held that judgment in favor of the owner as a matter
of law was error under a lease with exclusive control
provisions similar to the one we are considering. Under
the facts of that case the negligence of the driver was
imputed to the owner despite the lease, because the
driver was acting on the owners business.
When the sole own!er of the vehicle 1s present
and another is driving, it is presumed that the sole
owner has the right of control and that the driver is
driving for him as his agent. Fox v. Lavender, Supra.
The question of vvhether the driver is acting for the
owner should be determined from all of the evidence
and is generally a question of fact for the jury. Annotation, "Owner's presence in motor vehicle operated by
another as affecting O\vner's rights or liabilities", 147
ALR 960; 50 ALR 2nd 1281.
The question here presented is whether a consideration of all the evidence requires a finding that Sullivan
had no right of control over Higginbothan1. We submit
that in vie'v of the provisions of the lease previously
pointed out, Sullivan's pecuniary interest in the trip
( 65% of the proceeds) and Sullivan's presence in the

12
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truck, a question of fact was presented that required
the findings of a jury.

POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED IN THE FORM OF THE
QUES'riONS IN THE SPE1CIAL VERDICT SUB~llr_rTED TO THE JURY.
It was claimed by respondent that the S & I vehicle driven by Stone had neither lights nor flares
about it prior to the collision with the Western Auto
Transport Truck. The evidence was in conflict as to
lights on the truck, and so this was of course a jury
question. It was also claimed that Stone was negligent
by allowing the truck to run out of gas and in failing
to remove it from the traveled portion of the highway.
To resolve these questions, the court submitted a special
verdict. r~Phe first question on the special verdict was :
(R-90).

I(A) Was Harvey Stone negligent by allowing the
gasoline of one tank to become exhausted before switching to the auxiliary gasoline tank~
I(B) Was Harvey Stone negligent in failing to
remove the S & I Truck from the travelled portion of
the highway?
I (C) Was I--Iarvey Stone negligent in failing to
have lights on or flares about the S & I Truck immediately prior to the collision between the two trucks~
The vice apparent in these questions is that the
matter submitted to the jury is not whether Stone did
or did not do a certain act, but whether he was negligent
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in so doing. A very similar verdict \vas considered by
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Johnston v. Eschrich,
57 N.W. 2nd 396. In that case the clairn was made that
Eschrich had driven his truck with the tail lights obscured. The trial court submitted this interrogatory to
the jury:
"Question One"
"Was the defendant, Wm. Eschrich, negligent at
the time and place and under the circu1nstances existing and just prior to the time of the accident with
respect to:
(A) Transporting the load on his truck in such a
manner so as to obscure the taillight~
(B) Not having the said truck equipped with proper
reflectors."
In passing on this interrogratory the Supreme
Court said:
"At the very best, the question is confusing,
apparently asking the jury to decide whether it
was negligence for the defendant to transport a
load in such a manner as to obscure a taillight,
a question to which the statute gives an affirn1ative answer. The question should be framed so
that the jury may say whether the required light
was present and visible and the question of negligense \vould take care of itself. There is no
roon1 in the question submitted for the jury to
answer that the tail light 'vas visible before the
collision, if they believed that to be the fact,
although that is an issue to be deter1nined. \Ve
consider that the question s.ubn1itted is so subject

14
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to misinterpretation by the jury that a new trial
1nust be had in which the respective casual negligences of the parties may be determined by
answers to questions properly framed."

WP subn1it that despite the cautionary instructions,
the for1n of the interrogatories is confusing, and in effect tells the jury that a particular act was or was not
done, leaving only for the jury the question of whether
or not such action was negligence.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the
Trial Court should be reversed and remanded to the
Trial Court for a new trial.

HOWELL, STINE AND OLMSTEAD,
RICHARD W. CAMPBELL,
Attorneys for Appellant
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